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Civilians constitute a large share of casualties in civil wars across the
world. They are targeted to create fear and punish allegiance with the
enemy. This maximizes collaboration with the perpetrator and strength-
ens the support network necessary to consolidate control over contested
regions. I develop a model of the magnitude and structure of civilian
killings in civil wars involving two armed groups who ￿ght over territorial
control. Armies secure compliance through a combination of carrots and
sticks. In turn, civilians di⁄er from each other in their intrinsic preference
towards one group. I explore the e⁄ect of the empowerment of one of the
groups in the civilian death toll. There are two e⁄ects that go in opposite
directions. While a direct e⁄ect makes the powerful group more lethal,
there is an indirect e⁄ect by which the number of civilians who align with
that group increases, leaving less enemy supporters to kill. I study the
conditions under which there is one dominant e⁄ect and illustrate the
predictions using sub-national longitudinal data for Colombia￿ s civil war.
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11 Introduction
Over 3100 civilians died in 92 massacres in Algeria between August 1996 and
December 1998.1 The war between the government and various Islamist insur-
gencies (notably the Armed Islamic Group) spanned between 1991 and 2002 and
left a remarkably high civilian death toll. The legacy of massacres in Colombia
is equally distressing: Between 1988 and 2005 Colombian guerrillas killed 1200
civilians in about 200 massacres while over 6100 died in just under 1000 mas-
sacres perpetrated by right-wing militias.2 This pattern of terror is by no means
inherent to these two countries. Targeting civilians was the main strategy of the
Peruvian militias (Rondas Campesinas) to recover the rural strongholds under
the control of the Shining Path. Before the cease ￿re declared in October 2002,
the Sudan People￿ s Liberation Army targeted civilians all across southern Su-
dan to punish alleged supporters of Karthoum-backed militias (Johnson, 1995).
During Museveni￿ s rule in the 1990s, the Lord Resistance Army (LRA) alien-
ated the local population in northern Uganda by massacring civilians. Later, to
recover the lost territories, Museveni￿ s National Revolutionary Army used the
same strategy, killing alleged LRA supporters (Berkeley, 2001).
Most civilian killings are deliberately planned by both state and non-state
actors (Eck and Hultman, 2007). The number civilians killed intentionally and
directly in internal armed con￿ icts is about half the number of total deaths
in combat.3 War-induced famine and disease are likely to hit civilians further
both during the con￿ ict and in the post-con￿ ict. The death of non-combatants
represents an enormous long-term cost of civil war as it erodes the labor force
of a country. In addition the deliberate killing of civilians nurses hatreds and
revenge desires, triggering cycles of violence in what the World Bank calls a
"con￿ ict trap" (World Bank, 2003).
Civilians are targeted to create fear, spawn collaboration and consolidate
control of contested territories. Neither the insurgency nor the incumbent can
be successful without the support of civilians. The allegiance of the population
is a primary objective of the armed groups in civil war. Contesting parties seek
to form a ￿support network￿of locals to secure the provision of food, shelter,
supplies, information and recruits. The e⁄ectiveness of such network determines
the group￿ s success in securing contested areas.4
1Kalyvas (1999) reports all the massacre events that occurred in Algeria in that 29-month
period. Each event is described in terms of its date and location, and includes the number of
people killed.
2CERAC, a Colombian think tank, maintains an event-based dataset on the Colombian
con￿ict (see www.cerac.org.co).
3Lacina and Gledistch (2005) introduce a longitudinal dataset on battle deaths. The Up-
psala Con￿ict Data Program has a dataset on civilian casualties in civil war for the period
1989-2005 (see http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/).
4As pointed out by an IRA combatant: ￿Without the community we were irrelevant. We
carried the guns and planted the bombs, but the community fed us, hid us, opened their
homes to us, turned a blind dye to our operations￿(Collins 1999 cited in Kalyvas, 2006: p.91)
The same point is also emphasized by Carlos Castaæo, head of the Colombian militias:
"Since we could not combat [the rebels] where they were, we chose to neutralize the people
2Hence the strategic rationale of targeting the civilian network of the enemy
to weaken its power by damaging its local base. Petersen and Liaras (2006)
argue that fear and terror are e⁄ective weapons often used to bend the enemy￿ s
objectives. Azam and Hoe› er (2002) show that in Subsaharan Africa terroriz-
ing civilians is often used to substitute for actual combat. Because they generate
widespread fear, civilian killings not only reduce the support of the enemy but
also increase compliance with the perpetrator. So the degree of which di⁄erent
armed groups receive support from the population is endogenous to the dy-
namics of con￿ ict (Kalyvas, 2006): On the one hand, armed groups constantly
attempt to secure popular collaboration and deter support to rival groups. On
the other, irrespective of their true preferences, most people tend to collabo-
rate with the group that maximizes their survival opportunities. Indeed, when
caught in a juncture of violence people naturally tend to put survival consid-
erations and the protection of their family and property before their political
preferences. Thus, the control of a speci￿c territory by one group often leads to
compliance from local communities.5 Civilians are then compelled to participate
in combat for strategic considerations rather than ideology. Greater compliance
from the civilian population in turn helps consolidating control, making collab-
oration and control mutually reinforcing.
Collaboration is a zero-sum game. It must be exclusive and such condition
is enforced with violence. Defection is severely punished. Information leaks,
for example, are often punished with execution. Killing defectors creates wide-
spread fear, which deters others from doing so. In addition, non-compliance
with one group is equated with treason and also punished: Neutrality is not an
option for the civilian population who often, and not without risk, prefer to ￿ ee
the contested region. Households who choose to stay must show some allegiance
to one group or the other. Civil war is a polarizing process.
There are many factors that can alter the balance of power between the
armed groups of a civil war. A foreign power may intervene by providing ￿nan-
cial aid or military support to one group. During the Cold War a number of
civil strifes an Africa and Latin America were e⁄ectively proxy wars featuring
the support of either the US or the USSR to incumbent regimes or insurgent
movements. Several African governments supported the National Union for the
Total Independence of Angola and the governments of Rwanda, Uganda and
Zimbabwe have allegedly ￿nanced armed movements in Congo at least since the
fall of Mobutu in 1996. More recently, the Colombian con￿ ict has increasingly
been shaped by the participation of international actors and both the govern-
ment and the rebels have bene￿ted from external support: While the Colombian
government is the largest recipient of military aid from the US in the western
who brought to their camps food, medicine, messages, liquor, prostitutes, and these types of
things. And we realized that we could isolate them and that this strategy would give us very
good results" (Quoted in Kirk, 2003).
5According to Cenarro (2002), during the Spanish Civil War many leftists living in regions
dominated by the right-wing militias ended up supporting them.
In Colombia, collaboration with the FARC and ELN guerrillas is almost completely a rural
phenomenon.
3hemisphere, the Chavez regime from neighbor Venezuela has been accused of
protecting and ￿nancing the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).
Intervention from abroad can also take the form of donations from diasporas.
Examples abound and range from the support of the Tamil diaspora in North
America to Sri Lanka￿ s Tamil Tigers ￿ to the support Albanian diaspora in Eu-
rope to the Kosovo Liberation Army. The balance of power in civil war can
also be altered by ￿ uctuations in the value of natural resources that are used
to ￿nance armed groups.6 Additionally, Ross (2005) reports that rebel groups
have been able to raise substantial ￿nance by selling the future rights to war
booty. Insurgencies in Angola, Congo, Liberia and Sierra Leone have used this
practice. Finally, armed groups can boost their power by merging into uni￿ed
armies thereby sharing intelligence and taking advantage of military economies
of scale. One example is the collusion in 1997 of several local right-wing militias
in Colombia.
How is the security of the civilian population a⁄ected by shifts in the relative
balance of power of armed groups? Because civilians are strategically targeted
by local rebels and militias, the consequences of the empowerment of one of
them may be catastrophic. A stronger military capacity boosts the ability of
generating widespread fear by killing the civilian infrastructure of the enemy.
This direct e⁄ect of military empowerment maps into higher tolls of civilian
casualties. However, an empowered army that has built a reputation of execut-
ing enemy supporters is more frightful, and so induces some civilians to shift
their support towards it. Thus there is an indirect e⁄ect of empowerment that
works in the opposite direction and saves lives. The ultimate e⁄ect on civilians
casualties depends on the relative size of the direct e⁄ect vis-a-vis de indirect
e⁄ect.
This paper develops a simple rational choice model in which two armed
groups ￿ght for the control of a strategic territory. Local civilians are compelled
to decide which groups to support. This decision depends on the combination of
material payo⁄s and coercion o⁄ered by each group to the civilians as well as on
an idiosyncratic political preference that every individual has towards one armed
group. One obvious result of this simpli￿ed framework is that when the majority
of the population has strong a priori preferences towards one group, compliance
is so massive that such group is likely to consolidate territorial control easily.7
I derive an expression for the equilibrium number of civilians killed by either
armed group. The size of civilian casualties depends on the equilibrium size
of the "support networks" of the armed groups and the military capacity of
each of them. A testable comparative static is the e⁄ect on the number of
6Mahmud and Vargas (2008) provide an analytical framework to study the e⁄ect of resource
booms in civil war. They distinguish booms in cash crops like co⁄ee from booms in resource
intensive commodities like oil. The e⁄ect of resource booms also depends on the regime type
which proxies for whether the bene￿ts of the boom are concentrated in the hands of the mass
of citizens or the elite.
7This ￿ corner solution￿ can be illustrated by the fact that most foreign powers ￿nd it
extremely di¢ cult to subjugate colonized territories for too long. Polk (2007) argues that
because most human beings are territorial, they are seldom willing to accept foreign rulers.
4killings of a change in the balance of power of the two armies. I rationalize the
conditions under which the direct e⁄ect of empowerment dominates the indirect
e⁄ect and thus the casualty toll increases. Because the model describes a sub-
national phenomenon that cannot be contrasted with cross-national variation, I
am able to test the predictions using micro-level con￿ ict data across circa 1000
Colombian municipalities for the period 1988-2005. Consistent with the model,
I show that everything else equal a shift in the military capacity of one group
leads to an increase in the number of civilian killings only in territories in which
the enemy is more powerful.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the analytical
framework and the main testable predictions. Section 3 discuses the case study
of Colombia, a country that has experienced civil war for over 40 years and where
about a third of all the casualties are civilians killed directly and intentionally. I
exploit longitudinal variation across Colombian municipalities to test the model.
Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
I develop a simple analytical framework to study the pattern of civilian killings
in civil war given the strategic role of non-combatants regarding the formation
of networks for the provision of supplies, shelter and information to armed
groups. Like Wintrobe (1998)￿ s model on how dictators survive in power, in this
model armed actors simultaneously make use of carrots and sticks to achieve the
compliance necessary to build support networks. On the one hand repression
creates compliance by making people fear violent reprisals. On the other, loyalty
can be secured through material bene￿ts. The ideological preferences of the
potential supporters also play a role. The allegiance of the population is a
primary objective for the warring parties. No insurgency can be successful
without the support of civilians and no incumbent can retain power without it.
Russell (1974) illustrates this point eloquently:
"(...) [N]o mass rebellion can succeed without defection of some
of the regime￿ s armed forces. (...) [R]evolutionaries (...) must devote
a great deal of thought to how to encourage defections from the
police and the army." (Quoted in Gates, 2002).
2.1 Set up
Consider a territory of some strategic value in the context of an ongoing civil
war. Controlling such territory is desirable by the armed groups in dispute,
5which I henceforth assume are only two: The rebels, R and the militia, M.8;9
There is a continuum of mass 1 of civilians each of whom must decide what
group to support. Civilian i￿ s payo⁄ from supporting the rebels is linear and
additive in her expected material reward and in an idiosyncratic component
representing the individual￿ s bias towards supporting the rebels. It can be rep-
resented with the utility function:
Ui
R = (1 ￿ ￿M)wR + ￿i
R (1)
where ￿M is the probability of being killed by the militia ￿ who target i because
of her support to the rebels￿ , wR is the material reward that i receives in
exchange of her support, and ￿i
R is a non-negative payo⁄ derived privately by
civilian i and measured in the same units as wR: As in a standard probabilistic-
voting model (Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987 and Persson and Tabellini, 2000) this
component of the utility can be interpreted as parametrizing the ideological bias
of individual i towards group R.10
Similarly, individual i￿ s utility from supporting the militia is:
Ui
M = (1 ￿ ￿R)wM + ￿i
M (2)
where ￿R is the probability of being killed by the rebels ￿ who target i because of
her support to the militia￿ , wM is the material payo⁄derived by such allegiance
and ￿i
M is the non-negative idiosyncratic reward derived from supporting the
militia.
For completeness, consider a third option whereby i does not support either
armed group. In such case the utility of not taking part of the con￿ ict is given
by:
Ui
R;M = (1 ￿ ￿R)(1 ￿ ￿M)y + ￿i
R;M
where y is the outside option. This formulation captures the idea that neutral-
ity is a very risky strategy in civil war. Collaborators to one armed group are
automatically seen as non-collaborators of the rival group and hence targeted by
8The choice of these two actors over the more obvious Rebels vs. Government game is
consistent with the fact that in most civil wars it is illegal militias (usually with the acqui-
escence and support of the government) who target the civilian population. However this is
just a choice of notation. The two armed groups described in this model could as well be two
rebel groups. This has indeed been the case in speci￿c areas of countries like Congo, Angola
and Colombia.
9The model abstracts from the reason why achieving control over the territory is important.
Some such reasons may include the existence of a valuable natural resource, the control of
which would help ￿nancing the armed struggle; the necessity of consolidating a safe haven
for the cultivation of hard drugs or for the illegal transportation of arms and supplies; or the
strategic proximity of an important city or enemy￿ s camp.
10For an application of this approach to the context of the trade-o⁄ between democracy
and ￿ghting, see Chac￿n, Robinson and Torvik (2007). This parametrization of individual
allegiance is also consitent with Petersen (2001)￿ s account of how ordinary people became
involved in resistance movements in Eastern Europe. According to Petersen, there is wide
variation in patterns of civilian support toward armed groups. The level of support varies from
neutrality to sympathetic fellings to the provision of information to full involvement with the
group.
6the latter (Kalyvas, 2006). In this sense, the choice of neutrality implies becom-
ing a target of both armed groups. For simplicity I assume that the neutrality
alternative is strictly dominated by supporting either armed group for every
civilian i: This is equivalent of assuming that ￿i
R;M cannot take extraordinarily
high values and is naturally limited by survival considerations.
Opposition to all armed actors is of course observed in reality. Amidst other
reasons, in order to avoid the risk inherent to not aligning with any armed group,
a great number of civilians usually ￿ ee from territories under dispute. According
the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR, 2006), the country with the
largest number of internally displaced people is Colombia. Iraq and Sudan rank
second and third respectively. A Colombian NGO estimates that between 1988
and 2004 over 3 million people have internally migrated. The model I present
here abstracts from this phenomenon and in some sense deals with the situation
of civilians who choose not to ￿ee, and stay after any mass displacement has
taken place. The fact that in the model those who stay are forced to take side in
the con￿ ict is consistent with the empirical observation that collaboration must
be exclusive.11
The relative importance of wj;￿j and ￿i
j;j = fR;Mg depends of the stage of
the civil war at which ￿ghting takes place. The average civil war lasts about 16
years (Fearon, 2004). When the ￿ghting has lasted long enough, the provision of
material incentives gets harder as a larger share of the country￿ s infrastructure
has been damaged and local economies have been disrupted. As a result, the
relative importance of wj may be o⁄set overtime by an increase in coercion
￿j. The parameter ￿i
j is also likely to lose importance in the long run: initial
ideological convictions may be replaced by the accumulated hatreds created by
a long-lasting con￿ ict.
Given equations (1) and (2) civilian i will support the rebels if:








> 0 if ￿i
M > ￿i
R
= 0 if ￿i
M = ￿i
R
< 0 if ￿i
M < ￿i
R
This parameter is crucial in the analysis since it gives the private component
to (3) and hence allows individuals to di⁄er in their optimal decision. Notice
that, in the absence of ￿i, for any given set of material compensations and
coercion parameters, every civilian would support the same armed group. To
focus on the more interesting case in which civilian support is divided between
the two groups, let ￿ be distributed across civilians according to the probability
density function f(￿).
11Horton (1998) describes how the Contras repressed sympathizers of the Frente Sandinista
during the Nicaraguan civil war. As a result some peasants abandoned their farms. Some
others decided to stay and comply with the Contras, withdrawing support to the Sandinista
project. Horton quotes a peasant from Quilali town: ￿If you behaved well you wouldn￿ t have
problems [with the contras]. If not, it was a mess.￿
7De￿ne b ￿ = (1￿￿M)wR￿(1￿￿R)wM: From inequality (3) it follows that any
civilian i for which ￿i < b ￿ will support the rebels. Otherwise, she will support






while a fraction NM = 1 ￿ NR aligns with the militia.
Note that f(￿) depends on how attached the local population is to the cause
of one group or the other. In an extreme case, for a particular civilian i, ￿i would
be su¢ ciently negative (positive) that i would strongly support the rebels (the
militia). In order to make i switch sides the enemy would have to o⁄er extremely
high material rewards (w) but also high threats (￿).
Polk (2007) argues that the very presence of foreigners who attempt to con-
trol a speci￿c region stimulates a strong sense of group cohesion among natives
that often materializes in strong insurgency movements. To Polk the Vietnam
experience is the ultimate example of how, regardless of how many soldiers and
civilians are killed, how much money is spent and how powerful and sophisti-
cated are the weapons, foreigners cannot militarily defeat an insurgency that is
supported by the majority of the people, except perhaps by genocide. Examples
range from the Spanish Guerrilla against the French in the early 19th century
to the Mau Mau rebellion in Kenya in the 1950s to, arguably, today￿ s armed
resistance in Iraq against the Americans.
In sharp contrast with the corner solution in which a foreign power is ul-
timately defeated by a cohesive resistance, in most instances ￿i is likely to be
su¢ ciently small for the majority of the population. Only a small share of civil-
ians will be tightly attached to one party or the other. In fact, the majority of
people tend to be only weakly committed to any speci￿c group. That is, the
average non-combatant does not support any cause with su¢ cient conviction so
as to be willing to make big sacri￿ces. In this case of ￿weak￿inherent prefer-
ences, material incentives and military considerations can be more important
than actual political preferences at driving actions (what group to show alle-
giance to). In fact, irrespective of preferences, equilibrium behavior in terms of
support to a given group can change. Switching sides is common in civil war:
entire Algerian communities in the early 1990s defected the GIA to join the
militias (Kalyvas, 1999). Widespread fear created by the Rondas Campesinas
led to massive desertions of insurgents from the Shining Path in Peru during the
1980s. The Zapatista Revolution in early 20th century Mexico was only able to
overthrow Por￿rio Diaz when twenty six thousand men deserted from the con-
stitutional army and joined the rebels (Wolf, 1973). In Colombia, 46% of the
316 FARC members demobilized by 2002 stated that they joined the guerrilla
by force because a salary was promised, or simply because of fear. Only 12% of
the subjects claim to have joined the insurgency for ideological reasons (Pinto
et al., 2002).12
12However it is very likely that this number is a lower bound because of selection issues.
82.2 Civilian casualties
In this reduced-form framework, where the risk of death is unavoidable and given
both coercion ￿j and material incentives wj civilians who decide to support one
group are targeted by the other, both the rebels and the militia end up killing
civilians. This is consistent with the observation that in civil wars featuring local
contests for territorial control, civilian communities are strategically targeted by
all armed actors. In the model, the total number of civilian killings, KT; is then
the sum of killings by the rebels and by the militia. This can be written:
KT = ￿RNM(b ￿) + ￿MNR(b ￿) (5)
where the ￿rst term of the right hand side is the share of militia supporters
killed by the rebels, KR, according to their power ￿R; and the second is the
share of rebel supporters killed by the militia, KM.
I assume that ￿R and ￿M depend respectively on the power the militia and
the rebels. Hence ￿j provides the key comparative static of the model. Em-
powerment of group j maps into an increase in the parameter ￿j. Note that the
assumption is that a more powerful group is more deadly.
2.3 Empowerment
There are many di⁄erent potential reasons why the balance of power between
two armed groups can change in civil war. Foreign intervention is perhaps the
most notorious. The involvement of the Soviet Union and the US in Africa and
Latin America during the Cold War is an illustrative example. While the USSR
gave military and ￿nancial support to "communist" insurgencies ￿ghting in most
cases against authoritarian regimes, the US backed incumbents in their struggle
to content such insurgencies. Congo￿ s president Joseph Mobutu is a telling
example of a ruthless dictator backed by successive American administrations
because of its strategic value in the anti-communist campaign in Central Africa.
Donations by diasporas living in rich countries are another potential source
of empowerment. For many years the main source of ￿nance of the Eritrean
People￿ s Liberation Front was its huge diaspora (World Bank, 2003). Irish
Americans were suspected of contributing to the campaign of IRA in Great
Britain. Secondly, insurgent organizations in Angola, Congo, Liberia and Sierra
Leone have acquired non-negligible resources by selling the future rights on the
war booty (Ross, 2005). Third, ￿ uctuations in the value of natural resources
used to ￿nance armed struggles, like oil or diamonds are also a potential source
for the relative empowerment of one groups. Finally, there are also cases of
alliances and mergers of armed groups after which the resulting force is able
to bene￿t from increasing returns in the use of mass violence. The spectacular
upsurge of the late 1990s in militia activity in Colombia documented by Restrepo
Arguably the most ideological of the combatants of a rebel group are underrepresented among
those who demobilize.
9et al. (2004) originated in the collusion of a large number of militias from
di⁄erent parts of the country under an umbrella organization.
In the context of their strategic role in civil war as the source of the support
networks necessary for victory, would more civilians get killed if one group
becomes stronger?
I use the simple framework developed above and summarized in (5) to study
how changes in the military capacity of one group change the magnitude and
structure of civilian victimization. That this empowerment and hence greater
lethality translates into a greater number of killings is not obvious and I explore
the conditions under which this is the most likely outcome. Assuming that more
power maps into more killing capacity there is a clear direct e⁄ect whereby the
number of deaths will increase. However, everything else equal, a more lethal
group attracts more supporters who shift sides to reduce the chance of being
killed. This indirect e⁄ect can o⁄set the aforementioned direct e⁄ect and the
net impact on the number of casualties is ambiguous.
I illustrate these opposite e⁄ects by means of equation (5). I examine an
increase of, say ￿M; on KT: The total change in civilian casualties due to an
increase in the lethality of the militia, @KT=@￿M can be decomposed in the
change in rebel victims, @KR=@￿M; and the change in civilians killed by the






This expression is positive because ￿R is positive and ￿ using the chain rule-
@NM(b ￿)
@￿M can be written as the product of two negative numbers, so it￿ s also
positive. To see this notice that
@NM(b ￿)
@￿M = @NM
@b ￿ ￿ @b ￿
@￿M : From (4) @NR=@b ￿ > 0
and because NM = 1 ￿ NR then @NM=@b ￿ < 0: Finally, recall that b ￿ = (1 ￿
￿M)wR ￿ (1 ￿ ￿R)wM so @b ￿=@￿M = ￿wR < 0: Therefore:
Lemma 1 @KR
@￿M > 0: An increase in the power of the militia leads to an
increase in the number of civilians killed by the rebels
This result at ￿rst appears counterintuitive. The logic behind it is that,
everything else equal, a more powerful militia will attract more supporters (the
indirect e⁄ect) and hence the target population of the rebels will increase.
As conjectured, the e⁄ect of higher military capacity of the militia on the
number of civilians killed by the militia @KM=@￿M; is not unambiguous. Notice
from equation (5) that:
@KM
@￿M
= NR + ￿M
@NR(b ￿)
@￿M
where the ￿rst term of the right hand side, the civilian support of the rebels,
is greater than zero and the second is less than zero. The latter claim follows
10from the fact that
@NR(b ￿)
@￿M = @NR
@b ￿ ￿ @b ￿
@￿M and, while @NR=@b ￿ > 0; as pointed
out above @b ￿
@￿M < 0. The e⁄ect of a shift in the military capacity of the militia
on the number of civilians killed by the militia depends on whether or not the
direct e⁄ect of an increase in ￿M dominates the indirect e⁄ect.
Lemma 2 The change in the number of civilians killed by the militias
due to an increase in their own power is:
￿ @KM
@￿M > 0 if NR > ￿￿M (@NR=@￿M); so the direct e⁄ect dominates and
KM increases
￿ @KM
@￿M < 0 if NR < ￿￿M (@NR=@￿M); so the indirect e⁄ect dominates and
KM decreases
￿ @KM
@￿M = 0 if NR = ￿￿M (@NR=@￿M); so the two e⁄ects cancel out and
KM remains unchanged
Since both NR and NM depend on b ￿ which in turn depends on (￿j;wj); the
dominant e⁄ect will be determined by the parameters of the model. In order
to generate testable comparative statics, I now give a speci￿c functional form
to f(￿); the distribution across the civilian population of the net component of
political preferences on civilians￿payo⁄. I assume ￿i is uniformly distributed






: Recall that for any civilian i who is
ideologically biased towards the rebels: ￿i > 0; while ￿i < 0 re￿ ects bias toward
the militia. With this particular probability density function the density ￿ is
inversely related to the strength of ideology in the population. That is, ￿ is
directly proportional to how responsive individuals are to material incentives or
coercion. Given the functional form equation (4) becomes:
NR = 1 ￿ NM =
1
2
+ ￿[(1 ￿ ￿M)wR ￿ (1 ￿ ￿R)wM] (6)
Recall that the condition for an increase in the number of civilians killed by
the militia due to an increase in their power is NR > ￿￿M (@NR=@￿M): Using
equation (6) this can be written as ￿M < ￿
￿





















Summarizing the results so far, an increase in ￿M will lead to an unambiguous
increase in KR because the support of the militia increases and so does the pool
of civilians targeted by the rebels. In addition, to the extent that ￿M < ￿
￿
M
the direct e⁄ect of being more deadly will dominate and the number of civilians
killed by the militia will also increase. Hence, the total number of civilian
casualties will increase as long as ￿M < ￿
￿
M: However, if ￿M > ￿
￿
M the indirect
e⁄ect dominates and the reduction in NR due to the greater power of the militia
will o⁄set the increase in militia lethality so that the empowered militia will
11end up killing less civilians. Under this scenario and giving that @KR=@￿M is
unambiguously positive, it is uncertain what happens with the total number of
killings.
If the increase in civilian casualties by the rebels is proportionally greater
than the decrease in militia killings, overall more civilians will get killed when the
balance of power shifts in favor of the militia. That is @KR=@￿M +@KM=@￿M >
0: Using equation (6) this can be written as ￿M < ￿
￿￿















Proposition 1 summarizes the impact a shift in the balance of power that
favors the militia (and hence the impact of and increase in ￿M) on the number
and structure of civilian casualties in this model.




M be de￿ned as above. From Lemma 1 it
follows that @KR
@￿M > 0: In addition:
￿ If ￿M ￿ ￿
￿
M then @KM




M < ￿M ￿ ￿
￿￿
M then @KM
@￿M < 0 and @KR
@￿M ￿ ￿@KM
@￿M ; so that @KT
@￿M ￿ 0
￿ If ￿M > ￿
￿￿
M then @KM
@￿M < 0 and @KR
@￿M < ￿@KM
@￿M so that @KT
@￿M < 0
Figure 1 represents graphically the predictions in Proposition 1. The hor-
izontal axis measures the lethality of the militia: ￿M 2 [0;1]; and the vertical
axis the toll of civilian casualties. When, ￿M = 0; the militia is unable to kill any
of the rebel supporters and KM = ￿MNR = 0: Moreover, given KR = ￿RNM;
from equation (6) it follows that KR(￿M = 0) = ￿R
￿1
2 + ￿[(1 ￿ ￿R)wM ￿ wR]
￿
;
which is greater than zero.
For strictly positive killing probabilities of the militia, as long as 0 < ￿M <
￿
￿
M; then KM is increasing in ￿M: But it is decreasing once ￿M is greater
than the threshold ￿
￿






When ￿M = 1; civilians will die with certainty if they support the guerrilla.
Survival considerations imply a natural bound to positive values of ￿i so that
KM(￿M = 1) = 0: Yet, KR(￿ = 1) = ￿R
￿1
2 + ￿(1 ￿ ￿R)wM
￿
which is greater
than zero so KT(￿M = 1) will too be positive.
< Figure 1 about here >
122.4 Comparative statics
Recall that @KM=@￿M is positive if and only if ￿M < ￿
￿
M: Further, note from
equation (7) that ￿
￿





2 ; then ￿
￿￿
M is
also increasing in ￿R: It follows that a higher military capability of the rebel
group is associated with a larger parameter space for which an empowerment
of the militia will result in a higher death toll of civilians. This is a priori not
an obvious result. Intuitively this is because a higher ￿R implies that civilians
who support the militia are more likely to be killed and hence the indirect e⁄ect
of an increase in ￿M￿ whereby the support to the empowered militia increases-
will be weakened by the fact that the rebels themselves are also more lethal so
militia collaborators will be targeted by a more powerful enemy. Thus, the fact
that the indirect e⁄ect gets weakened is due to the fear that the rebels generate
among the civilians. In the next section I test this prediction using longitudinal
data of con￿ ict-related violence in Colombia.
Albeit not directly testable with the data at hand, equation (7) o⁄ers other
comparative statics of interest. For instance, ￿
￿
M is decreasing in ￿: That is,
when civilians are less ideological and hence more responsive to coercion and
material incentives, the increase in the lethality of the militia generates a higher
incentive to comply with them. Hence it is more likely that the indirect e⁄ect
will o⁄set the direct one so less civilians will be killed.
In addition ￿
￿
M is decreasing in wM which emphasizes the fact that on top
of coercion, illegal groups can o⁄er material incentives to increase compliance
of their support network, thereby reducing the support of the enemy and thus
the number of targeted people.
3 Testing the Model: Empowerment of Colom-
bian Militias
3.1 Background
3.1.1 Colombia￿ s armed con￿ ict
Colombia￿ s civil war involves rebel insurgencies, government forces and illegal
militias. By most accounts the civil war has lasted over four decades and scholars
identify its origin in La Violencia, a period of intense violence between the two
traditional political parties from 1946 to 1966. Insurgent groups were formed
in the early 1960s as peasant self-defense organizations originally aligned with
the Liberal party. Two of them survive today as the main guerrilla organiza-
tions: the FARC and the National Liberation Army (ELN) with about 20,000
and 4,000 combatants respectively. While allegedly the main objective of these
groups is taking over political power, their actions have increasingly relied on
terrorism. For instance the two most important sources of ￿nance for rebel
groups from the early 1990s are the drug business and the kidnapping of civil-
ians. Drugs are a major source of ￿nance especially for the FARC, which is
13known to tax coca crops, and to control the production, processing and export
of cocaine and heroine. In terms of bellicose activity the most common guer-
rilla actions are the disruption of the economic infrastructure (e.g, attacks to
oil pipelines), attacks to government military positions, and bombings and road
blocks.
The other major active armed actors of the con￿ ict are the illegal militias,
called paramilitary forces. They are said to have had over 12,000 members at
the peak of their strength. The ￿rst militias were organized by the military
during the late 1970s thanks to a law that permitted the formation of armed
self-defense organizations of civilians encouraged to ￿ght against the insurgents.
Subsequently, rural elites formed private armies which emerged on a widespread
scale during the eighties when drug lords started becoming landowners and
facing extortion from the guerillas. These militias were banned in 1989 but kept
operating in the shadow after which the Colombian con￿ ict technically became
three-sided. However, in recent years the vast majority of the ￿ghting involves
the guerilla against the military. Paramilitaries are not primarily a clash force
and try to avoid direct combat with either the guerrilla or the government forces.
Rather, the militia specializes in selective killings of civilians whom they presume
support the rebels. Seven out of ten civilians killed in Colombia from 1988 to
2005 have been victimized by armed militias, often with the alleged acquiescence
of the military. Over 70% of all the uncontested attacks carried out by militias
have been massacres, with incursions, check points and kidnapping taking up
the slack (Restrepo and Spagat, 2004).
3.1.2 The United Self-Defense of Colombia￿ AUC
In 1997, several disparate local militias came together under an umbrella alliance
called the United Self-Defense of Colombia (AUC), which contributed substan-
tially to the dramatic expansion of con￿ ict-activity during the late 1990s. The
AUC intensi￿ed its strategy of targeting civilians. Two thirds of the 7,000 civil-
ians killed by paramilitary groups from 1988 to 2005 died in one third of the
time, from 1997 to 2002 during the life span of the AUC. At the same time
Colombia witnessed a rapid geographical expansion of militia presence. Year
2000 was the peak of paramilitary activity with attacks in 120 municipalities,
four times the average geographical incidence of the pre-AUC period ￿ 1988 to
1997. This is consistent with the idea that civilians are killed as means of con-
solidating control over new strongholds. In the words of the AUC leader Carlos
Castaæo:
" I made of this con￿ict a high intensity war that now involves the
people it must involve: the hidden allies of the guerrilla" (quoted in
Aranguren, 2001, p. 116).
Indeed, the AUC publicly claimed that at least two thirds of the guerrilla
members were civilian supporters rather than proper combatants (Aranguren,
142001). The organization also argued that while the human rights constraints
prevent the Colombian military from involving civilians in the con￿ ict, the sur-
vival success of the rebels is determined by the capacity of coercing rural com-
munities into supporting them. According to the AUC rhetoric, an e⁄ective
counterinsurgency strategy must give priority to block these ￿guerrillas without
uniform￿ .
Taking advantage of a presidential transition, in 2002 the AUC leadership es-
timated the organization had enough leverage to cut a good deal on an eventual
peace process (see Romero, 2003). In December the AUC command unilaterally
declared a cease ￿re as a gesture to foster negotiations with the administration
of President Alvaro Uribe. Negotiations started in January 2003 and lasted
about three years, ending with a controversial peace process and a massive
demobilization of militia combatants in 2006 and 2007.13
3.2 Data
The con￿ ict dataset used in this paper was ￿rst introduced by Restrepo, Spagat
and Vargas (2004). Since 2005 it is mantained by CERAC, a Colombia-based
think-tank. It is an event-based con￿ ict dataset on Colombia covering the period
1988-2005. For every event the dataset records its type, the date, location,
perpetrator, and victims involved in the incident. The dataset is described
thoroughly by Restrepo et al. (2004) and Dube and Vargas (2008). Here I
provide a succinct account of the data collection process.
The dataset is constructed on the basis of events listed in the annexes of peri-
odicals published by two Colombian human rights NGO￿ s: CINEP and Justicia
y Paz. Most of the event information in these annexes comes from two primary
sources, a network of priests from the Catholic Church￿ with representation in
almost every municipality in Colombia-and over 25 newspapers with national
and local coverage. The inclusion of reports from the Catholic priests, who are
often located in rural areas that are unlikely to receive press coverage, broadens
the municipality-level representation. Based on these sources, the resulting data
includes every municipality that has ever experienced a con￿ ict related action
(either a unilateral attack or a clash between two groups). There is a strin-
gent regime to guarantee the quality and representativeness of the data. As
a ￿rst step a large number of events and is randomly sampled and compared
against the original source, to check for correct coding from the annexes into
the dataset. Second, a di⁄erent random sample is looked up in press archives to
con￿rm whether incidents should have been included in the annexes. This step
checks the quality of the raw information provided by the NGO￿ s, which turns
out to be quite high. Third, the largest events associated with the highest num-
ber of casualties are carefully investigated in press records. Finally, without
13Although the number of massacres dropped signi￿cantly,militia killings of civilians did
not stop. From 2003 several massacres have taken place. However, the government argues
that most of these violations are carried out by splinter militia groups and AUC dissidents.
15double-coding, the dataset is complemented with additional events provided in
reports by human rights NGOs and by Colombian Government agencies.
I use several variables from the CERAC dataset throughout the empiri-
cal analysis that follows. These include the number of civilians killed by the
paramilitaries (the dependent variable); the number of combatants killed; the
number of massacres of civilians14; and the number of attacks by the rebels,
which I treat as the baseline proxy of rebel power, ￿R (see Table 1). Other
proxies of rebel power are a dummy for the presence of rebel fronts (from the
Colombia Ministry of Defense); a dummy for the presence of coca crops in 1994
(from the Colombia National Police Department); and a dummy for whether
a municipality is a strategic stronghold of FARC, the country￿ s largest rebel
group (from Giraldo et al., 2001)￿ see Table 1.
I control for a number of observable time-invariant and time-varying municipality-
speci￿c characteristics including (the log of) population￿ which is used as scale
control-, poverty, health and education rates (all from DANE, the national sta-
tistics o¢ ce of Colombia); an index of institutional quality (from Fundacion
Social, a local NGO); and several geographic characteristics like altitude and
average levels of temperature and rainfall (from IGAC, the country￿ s geography
bureau)￿ Table 1.
<Table 1 about here>
3.3 Empirical analysis
3.3.1 Benchmark results
Recall from the discussion of the theoretical framework that an empowerment
episode triggers two opposite forces: an indirect e⁄ect and a direct e⁄ect. If
the militia gets more powerful, everything else equal, the higher the power of
the rebels the weaker the indirect e⁄ect, which operates by preventing rebel
supporters to switch sides. Hence militia targeting of civilians will be higher
in places where rebels are stronger. Table 2 shows evidence in this respect. I
regress the number of civilians killed by the militia on the interaction between
￿R (proxied by the number of rebel attacks in a given municipality-year) and
a dummy that takes the value of 1 from 1997 to 2002, representing the period
where militias colluded into the AUC15. The model predicts that the lethality
of the rebels should be positively associated with civilian killings by the militia,
especially after the formation of the AUC (which shifted the relative balance of
14Massacres are de￿ned as single killing events resulting in the death of at least four people.
15Clearly, this proxy of ￿R may be problematic. In particular, rebel attacks may be nega-
tively related to their power if such attacks occur in places where they seek to gain control
through violence. Table 2 delas with these concerns and show the robustness of the baseline
results to a number of potential proxies for the unobservable power measure.
16power in favor of the militia). In other words, an increase in the power of the
militia worsens human security especially in places where the rebels are more
powerful. I then expect the coe¢ cient on the interaction between the proxy of
￿R and a dummy for the militia collusion period to be positive and signi￿cant.16
<Table 2 about here>
Column 1 of Table 2 reports estimates from pooling the data across mu-
nicipalities, and years and running an OLS of the number of civilians killed
by the militia on the interaction of the number of rebel attacks and the six-
year period of militia empowerment (1997-2002) across the pooled data. This
speci￿cation controls for the non-interacted version of the two variables. Col-
umn 2 explores how robust the baseline result is to controlling for a battery of
municipality-speci￿c observable characteristics, both time-invariant and time-
varying. In particular, socioeconomic controls like the poverty rate, school en-
rollment and an indicator of average health conditions are included. Other con-
trols are municipality-speci￿c institutional quality, a dummy for whether the
municipality is urban or rural, geographical characteristics like average tem-
perature, altitude and rainfall, and (the log of) the municipality￿ s registered
population as a time-varying scale control. Column 3 adds state-speci￿c time-
trends. This is a very stringent test because there are about 1000 municipalities
but just 32 states. The trend controls for serial correlation over time and across
municipalities in the same state.
A potential problem with the approach taken in columns 1 to 3 is that it
does not account for potential unobserved municipality-speci￿c heterogeneity.
If present, such heterogeneity can take di⁄erent forms: It may be indepen-
dent from the covariates or it may be correlated with them. If the unobserved
characteristics are independent from the regressors a random-e⁄ects estimation
is consistent. However, if the unobserved heterogeneity is systematically cor-
related with the covariates, failing to remove the time-invariant unmeasured
municipality-level characteristics may confound the analysis since it leads to
omitted variable bias. Results from a Hausman test (not reported) suggest one
cannot accept the null hypothesis that the unobserved heterogeneity is uncorre-
lated with the covariates. That is, it seems that the data generating process is
best described by a ￿xed-e⁄ects model. Moreover, in addition to municipality-
speci￿c ￿xed-e⁄ects, in column 4 I include year ￿xed-e⁄ects, which control for
any arbitrary annual changes in the militia killing of civilians.17
16For conciseness, in the reported tables I only include the coe¢ cients of interest. Estimated
coe¢ cients on control variables have the expected sign and vary in signi￿cance. These are
available from the author by request.
17This speci￿cation absorves the time-invariant municipality-speci￿c controls. In this sense,
while ￿xed e⁄ects estimates are consistent even if the ￿ true￿ data generating process has
random e⁄ects, one disadvantage of ￿xed over random e⁄ects is that the marginal e⁄ect of
time-invariant regressors cannot be estimated. But this is not true for time-varying controls,
which can also be estimated using ￿xed e⁄ects. In any case, in the present analysis I do
not conduct substantive interpretation of the impact of any of the controls and focus on the
interaction which is relevant according to the theoretical model.
17All speci￿cations account for the fact that stochastic disturbances are likely
to be correlated over time within a given municipality, or may have covariances
that di⁄er across regions. Such potential problems of serial correlation and
heteroskedasticity respectively are taken care of by clustering the errors at the
municipal level. Hence reported standard errors in all tables are panel-robust.
Results show that the lethality of rebels (as measured by the number of
guerrilla unilateral attacks) is positively associated with the number of civilians
killed by the militia during the militia empowerment period.18 The coe¢ cient of
interest is signi￿cant at 99 percent of con￿dence and its magnitude implies that
a municipality going from the mean number of rebel attacks in the pre-AUC
period to one additional rebel attack during the empowerment of the militia will
have 1.1 additional civilians killed by the latter group. This ￿gure is remarkably
stable across the four speci￿cations and the e⁄ect is signi￿cantly di⁄erent from
zero in all cases.
3.3.2 Accounting for the count nature of the data
Count-data are highly non-normal and hence not well estimated by linear re-
gression. The Poisson model is usually incorporated to account for the data
generating process that produces counts. For a count yt taking values 0, 1, 2,...
the Poisson distribution has a parameter ￿ representing the mean number of
occurrences. The regression model sets:
E[ytjxt] = ￿t = exp(xt￿)
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3 ￿t Poisson models with and without ￿xed ef-
fects. As in Table 2 the latter includes year-￿xed e⁄ects to account for any arbi-
trary annual changes in the dependent variable in addition to the municipality-
speci￿c unobserved heterogeneity.19 The coe¢ cient on the interaction between
the proxy for the power of the rebels and the empowerment period of the militia
is once again positive and signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero at 99 percent con￿-
dence in both cases. Despite the di⁄erence in the magnitude of the coe¢ cients
reported in columns 1 and 2, the substantive economic quantity of interest is
very similar: A municipality going from the mean number of rebel attacks in
the pre-AUC period to one additional rebel attack during the empowerment
of the militia, will have 0.4 additional civilians killed by the latter group. De-
spite the fact that this ￿gure is quite smaller than the one predicted by the
linear regression approach (Table 2) its magnitude is far from negligible if one
18Note that I do not make any claim of causality since the power of rebels is likely to be
endogenous. Despite the fact that the ￿xed-e⁄ects approach of column 4 deals in part with such
endogeneity by controlling for unobserved characteristics that may be a⁄ecting both civilian
casualties and the power of the rebels, I interpret the econometric results as associations.
Nevertheless these associations are informative, especially since they are consisting with the
predictions of the theoretical framework.
19The ￿xed-e⁄ects Poisson model is estimated by conditional maximum likelihood. Because
the likelihood function is contional to the aggregate sum of counts the actual number of
observations used to estimate the parameters is smaller than the whole sample.
18takes into account that the average number of civilians killed by the militia
per municipality-year is 0.4, hence one additional rebel attack during the AUC
period will double the lethality of the militia.
<Table 3 about here>
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3 account for the fact that the simple Poisson
approach has two potential problems. First, the Poisson distribution sets the
population mean (￿) equal to the variance. However, it is often the case for
count variables to be overdispersed, that is to have the variance greater than
the mean. Here, the variance of the dependent variable (the municipality-year
count of civilians killed by the Colombia paramilitary) is 2.7, almost seven times
larger than the mean(0.4).20
The second problem of the Poisson approach is that count data may be
highly left-skewed, having ￿excess zeros￿ : Consider the process that could led
to a count being zero. A militia front may be stationed in a municipality but
abstain from targeting the civilian population. Another municipality may lack
militia presence altogether and hence present zero killings by the militia. In
the latter case zero militia killings are a certain outcome and thus the number
of zeros may be in￿ ated and killings in municipalities free of militia cannot be
explained in the same way as killings in militia regions. Here, 94.8% of the
14,370 observations the dependent variable is zero, so the data is indeed highly
left-skewed.
This discussion suggests that the Poisson assumptions are most probably
not met and di⁄erent models for count-data analysis should be considered. Col-
umn 3 of Table 3 ￿ts a (￿xed e⁄ects) Negative Binomial distribution which
can be regarded as a generalization of the Poisson with one additional ancillary
parameter that allows the variance to be greater than the mean. The model
estimated in column 3 of Table 3 produces an estimate of such parameter that
con￿rms the existence of overdispersion an validates the Negative Binomial over
the Poisson. The coe¢ cient on the interaction of interest is positive and signif-
icant and does not di⁄er substantively from the marginal e⁄ect implied by the
Poisson and reported above.
The standard Negative Binomial model does not distinguish between the two
possibly di⁄erent processes causing a high number of zero counts. Column 4 of
Table 3 ￿ts a zero-in￿ated Negative Binomial model. The complication of excess
zeros is corrected by combining two otherwise separate models: A Logit model is
used to predict the cases in which zero is a certain outcome and a Negative Bino-
mial distribution ￿ts the counts having non-certain zeros. For the former I use as
predictors the whole set of time-varying and time-invariant municipality-speci￿c
characteristics that otherwise serve as controls across speci￿cations. Once again
20These are however the unconditional mean and variance and their comparison only sug-
gests whether overdispersion is likely to be present. More formally, in the regression setting
one can test whether the conditional mean and variance are signi￿cantly di⁄erent from each
other or not.
19the estimated value of the ancillary parameter of the Negative Binomial suggests
that this model is more appropriate than the Poisson. In addition, the Vuong
test (not reported) suggests that the zero-in￿ ated model is signi￿cantly better
than the standard Negative Binomial. Finally, the coe¢ cient of interest turns
out to be robust to this general model that accounts for both overdispersion
and excess zeros and it is indeed positive and signi￿cant, this time at 95 percent
con￿dence. Its marginal e⁄ect is also virtually unchanged and so a municipality
going from the mean number of rebel attacks (0.6) in the pre-AUC period to
one additional rebel attack during the empowerment of the militia, will have on
average double number of civilians killed by the latter group.
3.3.3 Other proxies of rebel power
Proxying the power of an armed group that ￿ghts for territorial control with
the number of attacks it carries out on such territory may be problematic. It
could be argued that the opposite is in fact true: while the more contested a
territory is, the more bellicose activity there will be from contesting groups,
the consolidation of territorial control is associated with a rather peaceful pe-
riod ex post. Table 4 acknowledges such concern and looks at the robustness
of the benchmark ￿xed-e⁄ects model presented in Table 2 (column 4) to the
use of di⁄erent proxies of ￿R. Columns 1 and 2 use a dummy for whether a
given municipality is reported￿ by the military intelligence-to have respectively
a FARC or ELN front operating in a municipality, independently of whether
there has been any recent active bellicose activity by it or not. The idea is that,
everything else equal, rebels hold relatively more power in places where they are
reported to have a permanent basis. The results suggest that, with 99 percent
con￿dence, districts where there is a FARC (ELN) front had an average of 0.6
(0.7) additional militia-sponsored civilian killing in the period 1997-2002.
<Table 4 about here>
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4 look at other two proxies for ￿R. The coe¢ cient
of interest in column 3 is the interaction between the dummy for the militia
empowerment period and a dummy for whether a municipality grew any coca
plants in 1994 according to a survey conducted that year by the National Po-
lice Department. This is arguably highly correlated with the places where the
rebels have been traditionally powerful. Indeed, after the Medellin and Cali
drug cartels were dismantled in the early-to-mid 1990s the rebels took over the
control of the production-tra¢ cking chain. The militia was not involved in the
coca business until well after the formation of the AUC in 1997 (Aranguren,
2001). The interaction term is positive and signi￿cant so the baseline results
are also robust to the third alternative measure of rebel power and suggest
that, everything else equal, had an additional municipality been controlled by
the rebels in the period 1997-2002; in expectation such municipality would have
20had 0.7 additional civilians killed by the militia. In turn, column 4 focus on the
e⁄ect of rebel power proxied by an indicator of municipalities that, according
to the thorough study of rebel territorial control in Colombia by Giraldo et
al. (2001), are strongholds of the FARC, the largest rebel group in Colombia.
These are municipalities that: i) belong to the strategic backward of the rebel
group￿ mainly located in the states of Caqueta and Meta￿where the rebel com-
mand is thought to be located; ii) secure access to strategic roads and rivers (in
Caqueta, Cundinamarca, Huila and Guaviare) and iii) ensure a steady ￿nance
source for the rebel group. Column 4 suggests that these municipalities have
had on average 1.3 additional civilians killed by the militia in the period of the
empowerment of the latter relative to the previous period.
The baseline results are then robust to using a heterogenous set of proxies for
rebel power, in addition to time-varying scale controls, state-speci￿c time trends,
and year and municipality-speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ects, which account respectively for
time and municipality unobserved heterogeneity not captured by the controls.
3.3.4 Additional robustness checks
Table 5 reports additional robustness checks. Columns 1 and 2 check whether
the results are robust to changing the dependent variable. Instead of looking at
the number of civilians killed by the militia, these columns report the e⁄ect of the
interaction between ￿R and the militia empowerment period on the number of
civilian massacres carried out by the militia. The e⁄ect is positive and signi￿cant
suggesting that, even after controlling for municipality-speci￿c economic, social,
political, geographical and demographic characteristics, civilians were massacred
more by the militias in places where the rebels were more powerful.
Columns 3 and 4 perform falsi￿cation tests. A ￿ placebo￿empowerment pe-
riod, one that also last six years (as the true AUC life-span, 1997-2002), is used
instead to interact the proxy for ￿R. The coe¢ cient associating this interaction
with the number of civilians killed by the militia is insigni￿cant. Further, the
model predicts an association between the power of one of the contesting groups
and the number of civilians killed by the other. While combatants die as result
of clashes with contesting illegal armed groups or government forces, civilians
are target with the speci￿c objective of consolidate territorial control. Indeed,
a di⁄erent dependent variable (namely the number of combatants killed by the
militia) is not signi￿cantly associated with the interaction of interest, after con-
trolling for municipality-speci￿c and year ￿xed e⁄ects, state time trends and
time-varying characteristics of the municipality.
<Table 5 about here>
214 Conclusion
Most civil wars witness the killing of non-combatants by both state and non-
state parties. The objective behind this practice seems to be weakening the
enemy by eliminating its civilian support network, and take military advantage
over it. I capture this idea in a simple model were civilians stationed in a
contested territory are killed by the party they do not comply with. In this
context I examine under what circumstances the empowerment of one of the
groups will result in more or less civilian casualties.
There are two opposite forces captured by the model. On the one hand,
assuming that more power translates into a greater killing capacity there is a
direct e⁄ect whereby more civilians will die as a result of the greater killing ca-
pability. On the other hand this same mechanism dissuades some civilians from
supporting the enemy, so it is not clear whether the total number of civilians
killed increases or decreases. The model predicts that greater power will result
in more civilian killings only if the enemy is itself powerful enough.
Using an event-based dataset that permits exploiting the sub-national vari-
ation of the Colombian armed con￿ ict, I ￿nd empirical support for this predic-
tion. The empowerment of illegal right-wing militias resulted in higher killing
of civilians in places where the rebels are more powerful. This result is robust
to various econometric speci￿cations, set of controls, measures of power and
dependent variables.
Future work is needed to enrich the model with a more complex economic
environment that allows testing predictions on the pattern of killings in places
that vary in terms of their socioeconomic characteristics.
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     1.1. Intensity Measures
Militia killings of civilians count 0.44 2.7 CERAC
Militia massacres of civilians count 0.06 0.34 CERAC
Militia killings of combatants count 0.01 0.31 CERAC
     1.2. Proxies of Rebel Power
Attacks by rebels count 0.61 1.78 CERAC
Presence of FARC front
a dummy 0.48 0.5 Colombian Army
Presence of ELN front
a dummy 0.23 0.42 Colombian Army
Presence of coca crops in 1994 dummy 0.06 0.23 National Police Department
Municipality is FARC strategic stronghold
b dummy 0.07 0.25 Garcia et al. (2002)
2. Municipality Characteristics
     2.1. Time Invariant Controls
          2.1.1. Socioeconomic Characteristics
Poverty rate (index of unmet basic needs) 0-100 index 54.53 19.81 DANE
Education (secondary enrolment) percentage 0.57 0.26 DANE
Health conditions (< 1 year-old child mortality)
deaths per 




capita 1.14 0.84 Fundacion Social
Whether municipality is urban or rural dummy 0.70 0.46 Based on 2004 population
          2.1.2. Geographic Controls
Altitude meters 1,136.58 1,167.81 IGAC
Average temperature ºC 21.96 4.77 IGAC
Average rainfall mm
3 1,978.07 1,070.6 IGAC
     2.2. Time Varying Controls
Log of population ln(count) 9.66 1.05 DANE
a) FARC and ELN are the two largest rebel groups
b) See text for discussion




(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rebel power x militia 0.478 0.476 0.452 0.484
   empowerment period (0.122)*** (0.125)*** (0.130)*** (0.108)***
Time-invariant controls no yes yes no
Time-varying controls no yes yes yes
Time trends no no yes yes
Municipality fixed effects no no no yes
Year fixed effects no no no yes
Observations 14,370 12,420 12,420 13,740
* Significantly different from zero at 90 percent confidence
** Significantly different from zero at 95 percent confidence
*** Significantly different from zero at 99 percent confidence
TABLE 2
Dependent variable: Number of civilians killed by Colombian militias
Note - Panel-robust standard errors are in parentheses. Regression disturbance terms are clustered
at the municipality level. Time-invariant controls (coefficient estimates not reported) include poverty
rate, average education, health conditions, institutional quality, whether the municipality is urban or
rural and geographic characteristics like average rainfall, average temperature and altitude. The Log
of population (coefficient estimates not reported) is used as a scale control and it is time-varying.




(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rebel power x militia 0.058 0.026 0.045 0.044
   empowerment period (0.015)*** (0.005)*** (0.013)*** (0.020)**
Time-invariant controls yes no no yes
Time-varying controls yes yes yes yes
Municipality fixed effects no yes yes no
Year fixed effects no yes yes no
Excess-zeros correction no no no yes
Observations 12,420 5,462 4,995 12,420
* Significantly different from zero at 90 percent confidence
** Significantly different from zero at 95 percent confidence
*** Significantly different from zero at 99 percent confidence
TABLE 3
Results from Distributions for Count Data
Dependent variable: Number of civilians killed by Colombian militias
Note - Standard errors are in parentheses. Regression disturbance terms of columns (1) and (4)
clustered at the municipality level. Time-invariant controls (coefficient estimates not reported) include
poverty rate, average education, health conditions, institutional quality, whether the municipality is
urban or rural and geographic characteristics like average rainfall, average temperature and altitude.
The Log of population (coefficient estimates not reported) is used as a scale control and it is time-
varying. Column (4) uses a Zero-inflated negative binomial distribution
Poisson Negative Binomial
  




Proxy for rebel power: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Rebel power x militia 0.587 0.702 0.739 1.335
   empowerment period (0.213)*** (0.230)*** (0.442)* (0.791)*
Time-invariant controls no no no no
Time-varying controls yes yes yes yes
Time trends yes yes yes yes
Municipality fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Observations 13,740 13,740 13,740 13,740
* Significantly different from zero at 90 percent confidence
** Significantly different from zero at 95 percent confidence
*** Significantly different from zero at 99 percent confidence
TABLE 4
Robustness to Measures of Rebel Power
Dependent variable: Number of civilians killed by Colombian militias
Note - Panel-robust standard errors are in parentheses. Regression disturbance terms are clustered
at the municipality level. The Log of population (coefficient estimates not reported) is used as a scale
control and it is time-varying. Rebel power measures are: the presence of a FARC company in
column 1; the presence of an ELN company in column 2; whether there were illegal coca crops in a
given municipality in 1994 in column 3; whether a given municipality is part of FARC strategic










(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rebel power x militia 0.061 0.061 -0.044 0.000
   empowerment period (0.013)*** (0.011)*** (0.106) (0.004)
Time-invariant controls yes no no no
Time-varying controls yes yes yes yes
Time trends no yes yes yes
Municipality fixed effects no yes yes yes
Year fixed effects no yes yes yes
Observations 12,420 13,740 13,740 13,740
* Significantly different from zero at 90 percent confidence
** Significantly different from zero at 95 percent confidence
*** Significantly different from zero at 99 percent confidence
TABLE 5
Additional Robustness Checks
Note - Panel-robust standard errors are in parentheses. Regression disturbance terms are clustered at the
municipality level. Time-invariant controls (coefficient estimates not reported) include poverty rate, average
education, health conditions, institutional quality, whether the municipality is urban or rural and geographic
characteristics like average rainfall, average temperature and altitude. The Log of population (coefficient
estimates not reported) is used as a scale control and it is time-varying. Columns 1 and 2 report results from
falsification tests. Column 1 uses a placebo empowerment period for the militias. Column 2 looks at militia
killing of combatants as dependent variable. Columns 3 and 4 look at the robustness to using the number of
militia massacres of civilians as the dependent variable.
Falsification tests
Dependent variable: militia 
massacres
Ordinary Least Squares
 
 